OGC 63-3600

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations
Committee - 5 December 1963 - 9:00 a.m.

1. The Director met with the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee for approximately two and one-half hours, beginning at 9 o'clock. Present from the Subcommittee were:

Clarence Cannon, Chairman George H. Mahon Gerald R. Ford, Jr. Frank T. Bow

Accompanying the Director were Messrs. John M. Clarke and John S. Warner. No transcript was taken and there was no sweep of the room (Room 128 A - Old House Office Building).

2. Mr. Cannon opened the meeting by stating he was calling the meeting as a result of the letter which he received in the mail a few days ago from the Director. Mr. Cannon stated he did not have his copy and inquired if the Director had copies with him. Mr. McCone indicated he did not know to what Mr. Cannon was referring and Mr. Cannon stated he would get the letter from his office.



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- 3. Mr. Cannon, referring to newspaper reports of CIA policy involvement, then asked if the Director would discuss the Viet-Nam situation. The Director pointed out that the actions of the CIA station in Saigon were fully coordinated with the Department of State and the White House and that CIA activities in South Viet-Nam were fully known to the Ambassador and the country team. He stated the Agency does not make policy but reports facts to the policy makers. The DCI reported that CIA had nothing to do with the coup but did point out that an agent was in the joint staff headquarters during the coup and communicated with the station by radio-telephone constantly throughout the progress of the coup and that all facts were reported to Washington.
- 4. The Director stated he was extremely worried about the situation there, pointing out that the government could not get congealed and there was some dissension within the ruling forces. He commented that there was not full rapport between the leaders, Generals Dinh, Don, and Minh. He also indicated that civilians were not fully brought into the government at this time and that those civilians who were involved had unclear authority. He also pointed out that the war effort has not been improved by the new government and Viet-Cong activities have increased. The Director carefully noted that his concern with the situation did not mean that it was in danger of going down the drain or that it was desperate. On the other hand, he indicated that he saw little forward thrust going there. He mentioned Lodge's report to President Johnson that he expected great accomplishments in February or March and added that the DCI had informed President Johnson that there was no intelligence appraisal which supported this view.
- 5. In response to a question, Mr. McCone stated his view that the people of Viet-Nam are not truly capable of self-government pointing to the high illiteracy level and adding that in many areas of the country some of the people have not even heard of the name of their country. The Director indicated, however, that the situation was different as to the intellectuals in the city and that they are concerned with efforts at self-government. The Director also indicated that the U. S. should not go in with its own forces and fight this war and that U. S. strategy to train South Vietnamese to do their own fighting is sound. On the other hand, the U. S. could not simply pull out of South Viet-Nam and should "play the hand out." Mr. McCone stated that he subscribed to the "domino" theory of President Kennedy that if South Viet-Nam fell to the Communists, Laos and Cambodia

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would certainly go, followed by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and eventually the Philippines. In a larger context, domination by the Communists of these areas would have a vast effect throughout Latin America, the developing countries in Africa and in the Middle East. The Director pointed out that a takeover in Southeast Asia by the Communists would not present a serious military threat but the impact on other areas, e.g., Africa, South America, would be significant. In response to Mr. Mahon's question whether South American takeover by Communists would present a military threat, the Director observed that the situation in Latin America would be different militarily from that of Southeast Asia and that if there were domination of Latin American countries by communism permitting a Soviet military presence, particularly in the northern areas, this could be a distinct military threat.

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7. The Director mentioned his recent talk with Macapagal who stated that he had been very concerned some two years ago about internal unrest but that he is more hopeful now. With respect to the current Viet-Nam leaders, the Director indicated that many of them are responsible and with considerable ability but reiterated that there is evidence of developing tensions and rivalries.

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9. Mr. Cannon then referred to a Drew Pearson column	
onnection with Oswald and Ruby and asked various questions.	The
Director pointed out that the FBI is conducting an intensive invendent the Agency was cooperating on the foreign intelligence	sugation
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